EU counterterrorism strategy: value added or chimera?

Europe did not wake up to terrorism on 9/11; terrorism is solidly entrenched in Europe's past. The historical characteristics of Europe's counterterrorism approach have been first, to treat terrorism as a crime to be tackled through criminal law, and second, to emphasize the need for understanding the 'root causes' of terrorism in order to be able to prevent terrorist acts. The 9/11 attacks undoubtedly brought the EU into uncharted territory, boosting existing cooperation and furthering political integration-in particular in the field of justice and home affairs, where most of Europe's counterterrorism endeavours are situated-to a degree few would have imagined some years earlier. This development towards European counterterrorism arrangements was undoubtedly event-driven and periods of inertia and confusion alternated with moments of significant organizational breakthroughs. The 2005 London attacks contributed to a major shift of emphasis in European counterterrorism thinking. Instead of an external threat, terrorism now became a home-grown phenomenon. The London bombings firmly anchored deradicalization at the heart of EU counterterrorism endeavours

Jihadi terrorism and the radicalisation challenge: European and American experiences

Osama bin Laden’s demise in May 2011 marked only the symbolic end of an era. By the time of his killing, he no longer represented the Robin Hood icon that once stirred global fascination. Ten years after the 11 September 2001 attacks, jihadi terrorism has largely lost its juggernaut luster. It now mostly resembles a patchwork of self-radicalising local groups with international contacts but without any central organisational design - akin to the radical left terrorism of the 1970s and the anarchist fin-de-siècle terrorism. This volume addresses two issues that remain largely unexplored in contemporary terrorism studies. It rehabilitates the historical and comparative analysis as a way to grasp the essence of terrorism, including its jihadi strand. Crucial similarities with earlier forms of radicalisation and terrorism abound and differences appear generally not fundamental. Likewise, the very concept of radicalisation is seldom questioned anymore. Nevertheless it often lacks conceptual clarity and empirical validation. Once considered a quintessential European phenomenon, the United States too experiences how some of its own citizens radicalise into terrorist violence. This collective work compares radicalisation in both continents and the strategies aimed at de-radicalisation. But it also assesses if the concept merits its reputation as the holy grail of terrorism studies

Europe: reinforcing existing trends

The main impact of 9/11 on European societies has been to crystallize the pre-existing debate on immigration around the culturalist paradigm. In mainstream thinking the culture of the immigrants came to be seen as the major obstacle to their integration. Issues as discrimination, disadvantaged socioeconomic position, and unemployment in the immigrant communities and their impact upon radicalization receded in the publics’ mind. Whilst the febrile debate on the compatibility of Islam with western values that had ensued has abated, a decade long Islam-centered security obsession has left its mark. Anti-Muslim prejudice has gained traction in mainstream thinking – even if its most extremist expression has again become the hallmark of a new generation of radical right groups, who claim the anti-Islam and anti-immigration themes as their unique selling proposition. But as was the case before 9/11, the situation differs among countries, with some countries displaying a more serene debate about the place of Muslims and Islam in society than others. One could argue that as apprehension among the public about Islam fluctuates, polity and media shoulder a crucial responsibility as to the way this issue is framed and discussed.Immigration and integration will indeed undoubtedly continue to be matters of intense policy discussion, sometimes (but not always) linked to Islam. Since Europe too has become an immigration continent, it experiences the same fluctuating apprehensions about the newcomers’ impact on society as the United States did with the nativist movement from the 19th century onwards. Nativist anti-immigration sentiments indeed remain present in European countries as well as grievances resulting from the fragile socio-economical position of immigration communities. This mix remains a potent cocktail for polarization and a major challenge for society in general. But they are now by and large devoid of the national security concerns they were associated with in the years following 9/11

Facing the fourth foreign fighters wave: what drives Europeans to Syria, and to IS? Insights from the Belgian case

Exactly one year ago, the first edition of this Egmont Paper was released. Its aim was to explore the wider circumstances that could help explain the decision of thousands of, mostly young, European volunteers to journey to a faraway war theatre in the Levant. This Egmont Paper is a thoroughly revised, updated and expanded version. Several new features have been introduced. It proposes, firstly, a more systematic attempt at understanding why people with different social backgrounds feel attracted by IS, also known by its Arabic acronym Daesh. Two categories of Syria travellers (a more general term than ‘foreign fighters’) can be identified. For a first group comprises pre-existing kinship and friendship gangs. For them, joining IS is merely a shift to another form of deviant behaviour, next to membership of street gangs, rioting, drug trafficking, and juvenile delinquency. But it adds and opens a thrilling, bigger-than-life dimension to their way of life – indeed transforming them from delinquents without a future into mujahedeen with a cause. Whereas most individuals of the first group are known to the police, this is not necessarily the case for the second group. Before suddenly deciding to leave for Syria, the youngsters in this group didn’t show any sign of deviant behaviour and nothing seemed to distinguish them from their peers. But frequently they refer to the absence of a future, to personal difficulties they faced in their everyday life, to feelings of exclusion and absence of belonging, as if they didn’t have a stake in society. They are often solitary, isolated adolescents, frequently at odds with family and friends, in search of belonging and a cause to embrace. At a certain point, the succession of such estrangements resulted in anger. The relative share of both groups may differ according to national backgrounds. But, however different in background and motivations, they share common characteristics. Together these constitute the subculture on which IS’ force of attraction thrives. ‘No future’ is the essence of the youth subculture that drives the majority of Syria travellers from the West. The explanation for their decision is found not in how they think, but in how they feel. Going to Syria is an escape from an everyday life seemingly without prospects. Vulnerability, frustration, perceptions of inequity, and a feeling that by traveling to Syria they have nothing to lose and everything to gain, are common traits among both groups. Religion is not of the essence. As of lately, Europol has also begun to acknowledge the declining role of religion in the foreign fighters issue. Religion has systematically decreased as a driver of terrorism as the waves of foreign fighters succeed one another. This is indeed the second new feature of this updated Egmont Paper. On closer examination, the current foreign fighters movement represents the fourth wave of jihadi terrorism, as originally conceived by Marc Sageman in 2008. The first wave fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan and became the companions-in-arms of Osama bin Laden. The second wave were often elite expatriates from the Middle East who went to the West to attend universities. Motivated by the suffering of Muslims in Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir, and the Philippines, they volunteered to fight in those hotspots. But by 2004–2005, the first two waves of truly global jihadi travellers had reached their limits. The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 breathed new life in the decaying jihadi terrorist scene. A new wave of radicals emerged, angered by this invasion. This wave was labelled ‘home-grown’. They entered the jihadi scene through local kinship and friendship bonds, and were often connected to the global context via the internet. By 2008-2010, the third wave too had run its course. The start of the civil war in Syria in 2012 and the emergence of potent jihadi groups in the Levant, in particular IS, once again reinvigorated a waning jihadi movement. It gave rise to a new, fourth wave of militants and wannabe foreign fighters. The fourth wave resembles its immediate predecessor by the local dynamics of the networks. Nowadays too, they are formed among friends and family who have known each other for years. Distinct from the third wave is the opportunity to again link up with one another on the battlefield, as part of a conquering terrorist and insurgent organisation: IS. As a result, technical expertise can again be acquired and skills transferred, in particular training with assault weapons. Just like the preceding waves, the fourth wave of foreign fighters too will ultimately end, mostly for the same reasons as its predecessors. But the time needed to reach this point depends also on the measures we collectively take in reacting to the phenomenon. A final new section in this update deals with these measures. Five policy recommendations are suggested that might effectively contribute to countering the current wave of foreign fighters – and protect a new generation from following suit. Firstly, reframe the debate. Unless we understand how the motivations of the fourth wave foreign fighters essentially derive from a ‘no future’ subculture and not simply from a narrative, prevention will fail. Secondly, focus on tailor-made approaches. One-size-fits-all overall deradicalisation initiatives will be of marginal use. Thirdly, separate the discussion on Islam in Europe from deradicalisation initiatives. The discussion on a ‘European Islam’ is a discussion worth to be held for its own merits, on its own terms, and with Muslims in the lead. It should not be pushed within the deradicalisation framework. Not only will this not work as envisaged, it will also harden positions, corrode an already fragile social fabric, and thus backfire. Fourthly, don’t get terrorized by terrorists. Following the July 2005 bombings in London, the London mayor Ken Livingstone reacted in simple and inclusive terms. Inclusiveness is a tough thing to come by in today’s frenzied debates. Finally, invest in intelligence (for a proper long term perspective) and encourage short-term operational information sharing. Looking for explanations for vicious behaviour doesn’t imply justifying it. The sole responsibility for the violence perpetrated by foreign fighters are the foreign fighters themselves. Each and every person is ultimately accountable for his or her actions. But understanding the context is crucial if one is to devise adequate measures and prevent yet another generation from becoming receptive to the siren songs of extremist political violence

Obama moet bescheiden zijn. = Obama must be modest. Egmont Commentary, 19 January 2009

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Anticipating the Post-ISIS Landscape in Europe

It often looks as if it’s prudent – or realistic – to favour gloomy predictions so as not to be labelled naïve. Dire predictions indeed predominate in the assessments of what might follow after the territorial defeat of ISIS in Syria and Iraq. Ominous scenarios were advanced as soon as it became obvious that the military campaign against ISIS was gaining ground. Most worst-case predictions did not materialise, however

Quelle déradicalisation face à la génération Daech

The summer of 2016 was overshadowed by lone actor attacks in France and Germany (and elsewhere in the world). In Europe, they followed earlier attacks by organized networks in Belgium and France. On Saturday night 17 September, St. Cloud, Minnesota, suffered a similar attack, reviving memories of the San Bernardino and Orlando shootings. These so-called lone wolves are often not as solitary as routinely imagined. Some of them operate in clusters too and most of them have some link to ISIS, be it sometimes very tenuous. Do these attacks signal a new terror strategy, compensating for ISIS’ loss of territory in Iraq and Syria and the shrinking number of volunteers willing or able to join it (in Belgium, no one has left for the Levant since January 2016) ? Probably less than generally assumed. Rik Coolsaet argues in the September issue of the Belgian Police Journal that the grassroots attackers of the summer of 2016 (and thereafter) and the organized terror networks are part of the same ISIS generation, for whom radical ideology is no longer the driver of their journey into violence. Countering ISIS’ pull and preventing a future terrorist organization to tap into unresolved root causes ask for a thorough reconsideration of the current concept of deradicalisation

Anticipating the post-Daesh landscape

Daesh with its proto-state and its shining aura of invincibility and unstoppable expansion, attracting myriads of foreign volunteers to the Levant, is rapidly coming to an end. What happens next ? Worst-case predictions often grab the headlines. But jihadism has waxed and waned over the last three decades. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the fascination with Daesh will die out as a result of the failure of its state project, since this constituted a critical part of Daesh’s force of attraction. This offers a window of opportunity for addressing the conducive environments that permitted Daesh’s success in widely different locations around the world, including in Europe. If we fail to seize this moment, at some point in the future the re-emergence of yet another jihadi wave cannot be ruled out